ABSTRACT. The lack of accurate measures of human capital formation often constrains investigations into the long-run determinants of growth and comparative economic development, especially in the developing world. Using the reported ages of criminals in the Court of Justice records in the Cape Archives, this paper documents for the first time numeracy levels and trends for inhabitants of the Cape Colony born between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries: the native Khoesan, European settlers, and imported slaves from other African regions and Asia. This variety of origins allows us to compare contemporaneous levels of early modern development across three continents. By isolating those slaves born at the Cape, we also provide a glimpse into the dynamics of human capital transfer in a colonial setting. The Colony's relatively high level of human capital overall had implications for what was later to be the richest country on African soil, but the very unequal attainment of numeracy also foreshadowed extreme income inequality.
Economists agree that human capital formation is an important determinant of long-run economic performance. Hence, the divergence in global incomes over most of the twentieth century must to some extent be the result of different levels of human capital formation during earlier periods. This hypothesis has recently found empirical support via a new measurement technique. Following the pioneering study by Mokyr 1 , and using numeracy (calculated using an 'age-heaping' indicator) as a measure of human capital, recent studies found a positive relationship between rates of numeracy and level of development. 2 This close correlation allows us to investigate the root causes of economic development today, even in the absence of reliable measures of early per capita income.
While African economic history is receiving greater attention, 3 the scarcity of written records for many African societies from the early modern period has prompted a search for other ways of quantifying development. This study used court records from a unique African society: the Dutch Cape Colony of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The court proceedings document the ages of individuals born over a 135-year period, allowing, for the first time, a thorough investigation of human capital in the early Cape Colony. Further, the diverse nature of Cape society makes it possible to compare the levels of human capital formation of at least seven contemporaneous eighteenth-century population groups:
northwestern Europeans, Cape native Khoesan, and East African, Madagascan, Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese slaves. Given the close correlation between numeracy and economic performance, comparing the numeracy levels of these groups provides a snapshot of early modern economic development.
We used a sample of 1,802 individuals documented in the Court of Justice records between 1692 and 1827. 4 As basic numeracy is attained during the first decade of life, we organized the sample into birth cohorts. 5 After taking into account a number of possible biases, we were able to find evidence of the human capital acquisition of Africans, Asians and Europeans. We found that the educational level of most of the non-European population groups did not improve during the first two centuries after contact with Europeans. In contrast, the settlers of Dutch and other European origin already had very high levels of human capital at the start of the eighteenth century, which may also help to explain the rapid increase in inequality between the different groups.
But inequality also existed within the slave society. We found that Cape-born slaves attained higher levels of numeracy than slaves born outside the colony, and we posit reasons for this divergence. Education in the Cape slave lodge may explain part of the difference, but another explanation is that the Cape may have had better childhood nutrition, which is likely to be positively correlated with height and cognitive ability.
Below we provide, for the first time, quantitative evidence of the large disparity between settler and slave human capital levels. This inequality seems to have persisted: South Africa today is one of the most unequal societies in the world, in terms of both education and income. Our research results on Cape Colony numeracy levels suggest a historical explanation for South Africa's education inequality. However, given the higher level of numeracy of Cape-born slaves that we will identify below, we could also imagine an alternative scenario of converging human capital levels between the ethnic groups. In fact, it seems quite likely that political counter-forces during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries restored the educational differences.
Our historical study also helps to explain why the country's income and development level is higher than most other countries in Africa and in south and south-eastern Asia, and why its GDP today is situated between the richer and the poorer parts of the world.
I
Hanushek and Woessmann 6 identify three ways that education may promote long-term economic growth: it increases the human capital component of the workforce, thus increasing labour productivity; 7 it encourages the development of knowledge and information about new technologies and products; and it improves people's ability to implement new technologies. 8 Recent studies have found not only that an improvement in the quantity of education 6 Hanushek and Woessman, 'The role of education quality ', p. 20. 7 See also Barro, 'Human capital'; Barro and Lee, 'International data'. 8 See also Nelson and Phelps, 'Investment in humans'. increases economic growth, but also that if education quality is taken into account as a variable in a regression analysis of economic growth, then the effect of number of years of schooling, i.e. quantity of education, diminishes. 9 These effects are robust across countries and periods.
10
These seminal contributions focus on the recent past, but less is known about pretwentieth-century education and long-run development. 11 The scarcity of available historical data means that researchers often rely on proxies for human capital formation, rather than 16 Hanushek and Woessman, 'The role of education quality'. We also note that educational attainment (using indicators such as 'per cent having finished primary school') may not be similar to education quality across all Basic numeracy is estimated using the Whipple index. This index is denoted mathematically in equation (1), and a linear transformation of the index is made in equation
(2), yielding the ABCC index. 17 The ABCC index reports a numeracy score between 0 and 100, with 100 representing a fully numerate society. In other words, the ABCC index estimates the share of the population able to report their own age to the exact year. 
Age-heaping is used to indicate not only the relationship between human capital and growth but also the role of human capital inequality in a country's development trajectory.
Assessing gender inequality in the Netherlands, de Moor and van Zanden found that women had a relatively high level of education, which brought about positive demographic changes and increased women's involvement in the labour market. 18 the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands, the Cape became a de facto mercantilist society.
All its inhabitants were subjected to the rule of law imposed by the colonizers. Taiwan, 22.7 per cent). Figure 1 shows the origins of the slaves in our data set. Our percentages below the place names should be compared to Shell's. Our sample does not entirely reflect the Shell estimates, which may introduce some bias (see Table 1 by him, together with all the preparatory information, collected by him, and a specific list of all the witnesses, in favour of, and against, the Accused, to the best of his knowledge: together with the interrogatories, on which he considers the Prisoner, or Defendant, should be examined.
The 'examination' included a question about age. Frequently, the accused would merely guess their ages. In the Dutch transcripts of legal cases, mention was made of naar gissing (guessing), which means that either the defendant was guessing or the person recording the events assumed the defendant was guessing. There is no indication that any attempt was made to ascertain or counter-check the age of the accused before trial. Although such information could be available from baptism records for slaves born at the Cape or from slave sale deeds, no specific mention was made of age at the commencement of a court case, probably because it was not considered very important.
33
We can see the possibility of bias here. Could it be that some groups were less likely to be questioned about their age? The articles quoted above show no discernible bias in favour of any group. Our calculations show that the naar gissing variable is closely correlated with slave and Khoesan defendants, but not exclusively so, which suggests that legal representatives did in fact question defendants from all groups about their age. Several
European settlers, for example, also register a naar gissing.
The Court of Justice in the colony started to record criminal cases at the end of the seventeenth century and continued to do so consistently well into the nineteenth century. Table 2 shows details of these by birth decade. The number of cases was quite substantial after the 1670s, although the European share was slightly higher in the first two well-documented decades of the 1670s and 1680s. The average age did not change dramatically (except for some exceptional values at the beginning). The share of those 'not guessing' was high in the first four decades, considerably lower in the next five and slightly higher in the final seven. This does not correlate perfectly with ABCC (numeracy) development over time, which was declining in general. It reached a low level for the birth cohort from the 1750s to the 1780s but increased for the 1790s cohort. This discrepancy between the trends in numeracy and ageguessing may have something to do with the prejudices of the white penitentiary officers, who assumed that people of African and Asian origin would guess their ages, whereas
Europeans would not (the correlation between 'not guessing' and 'European' is very high, 0.85, p=0.000). This finding confirmed that we should calculate numeracy by ethnic group.
[ neglecting to include them in the analysis would bias our estimates for Europeans upwards.
We used three strategies to assess the extent of this possible bias. First, as explained below, we controlled for the severity of crimes in our regression estimates. This had the effect of giving a lower weight to those parts of the distribution that were less prevalent in the other groups (but does not fully cope with possible censoring, of course). Second, to obtain partial evidence of possible censoring, we chose only two types of crime, theft and murder, and compared the different groups. If the results were similar to the general model, there would be less reason to suspect that this bias significantly distorts differences between groups. We found that non-Europeans who committed theft had an ABCC of 26.7 whereas Europeans had 88.3 (see Table 3 ). The corresponding figures for murder were 31.8 and 96.7. We concluded therefore that there was a small downward bias of both ethnic groups for theft if we assume murder to be relatively undistorted (15 per cent for non-Europeans and 8 per cent for Europeans). The difference between the ethnic groups was more than 60 per cent in both cases. However, since the extent of this bias might have been influenced by temporal composition effects, we then performed a regression analysis, as described in the following section.
[TABLE 3 AND 4 HERE]
Our third strategy, to assess the possibility of bias more closely, was to consider whether a social gradient of crime types existed. The fact that this gradient exists today does not necessarily mean it existed in early modern times, and in the eighteenth-century Cape Colony in particular. To study this, we ran regressions of the probability that an accused person stated an exact age rather than a rounded approximation (see Table 4 ). We distinguished four types of crime: 'minor', meaning small crimes below the level of theft, such as not reporting someone else's theft to the authorities, 'theft' that did not involve violence, 'violence', and 'murder'. We also included time and world region fixed effects in order to exclude composition effects. As a result, we found that only the numeracy of those committing minor crimes was significantly different from the constant, which refers to those who committed theft. But minor crime accounted for only for a small minority of cases.
Those who committed murder were around 4 to 5 per cent more numerate than those who committed theft, but the coefficient was insignificant. Violent crimes rated between theft and murder in terms of numeracy.
[FIGURE 2 AND 3 HERE]
The severity of crimes and punishments over time may also influence selection. We assessed the extent of severe crimes and punishments by calculating the share of severe crimes (such as violence and murder) and the share of severe punishment (hanging and other harsh sentences). Both series trended slightly downward over time (see Figures 2 and 3). For both Europeans and non-Europeans, the share was around 30 to 35 per cent for the early birth cohort, and then declined to 20 to 25 for the later cohorts. Moreover, we observed that punishment was much more severe for non-European offenders in the first birth cohort, whereas for later cohorts the severity of punishments was similar. The overall decline in the severity of punishments would suggest that there might be a downward bias for the later cohorts because a larger number of minor criminals were included in the sample. The question is, how large was this bias? Less severe crimes accounted for around 65 to 70 per cent in the first birth cohort and 75 to 80 per cent in the later cohorts. If we use a rough estimate of 5 per cent less numeracy for the petty crimes like theft and minor offences, the ABCC levels in our sample should be upwardly adjusted by around 3 to 4 per cent for the early cohort. The difference between early and middle-to-late birth cohorts of around 10 per cent more petty crimes for the later cohorts is almost negligible: 10 per cent difference in the share of petty crimes, relative to 5 per cent ABCC difference results in a negligible bias of 0.5 per cent between the early and the later cohorts.
We wondered whether theft rates were higher among slaves, relative to Europeans. To obtain diagnostics about possible censoring of less educated Europeans (and perhaps more numerate non-Europeans), we calculated crime rates per population. We used Shell's estimates of the number of slaves to deflate the number of criminals originating from the slave population. We used Fourie and van Zanden's estimates for the European population to calculate the corresponding crime rates. 36 On average, all crime rates were higher for slaves (see Table 5 ). Murder rates declined for both the Europeans and the slave group. 37 Hence the decline in murder rates is probably not evidence that the authorities overlooked petty crimes.
It might also be informative to compare the ratio of murder rates to theft (see column 9, Table   5 ). We might imagine that slaves committed more crimes in general because of their oppressed status. Yet there is enough evidence to suggest large differences in European levels of wealth; 38 European settlers therefore had no less incentive than slaves to engage in crimes with a financial motive. In fact, this is supported by the evidence: Europeans were actually accused of theft more often than murder (arithmetic average: 10.7 times more theft than murder), whereas the ratio for slaves was lower (only 6.4 thefts per murder). In other words, it seems unlikely that Europeans who committed theft and similar crimes were prosecuted less often because the authorities were more lenient toward them (at least relative to murders). A possible explanation could be that the Calvinistic Dutch authorities did not accept it if their European subjects committed small crimes either. In summary, the ratio 36 As no decadal population estimate exists for the Khoesan, they are excluded here. 37 Cf. Eisner, 'Modernization', p. 623. See also app. E, which shows, using examples from Belgium and the Netherlands, that the decline in rates of murder by Europeans at the Cape was strikingly similar to the decline in murders by Europeans in Europe. 38 Fourie and von Fintel, 'Settler skills and colonial development'.
between theft rate and murders suggests that there was no under-sampling of a large part of the poorer European population. In addition, the comparison with scattered census data of Asian (and more systematic census data for Europeans) we report in section IV suggests that the court record bias cannot be very large.
[ We also looked at possible bias in our selection of slave imports. We needed to know the extent to which the slaves in our sample were representative of the general populations of the countries of origin included in our study. There could be bias if there had been a strong decrease in the cost of transporting slaves, allowing slave traders to bring more slaves to the Cape including slaves from regions with less basic skills. However, a substantial literature has argued that transport costs in intercontinental shipping did not decrease until the nineteenth century. 39 Nevertheless, we admit that the way slaves were selected might influence our results, although, again, we note in section IV that the slaves had broadly similar numeracy levels to that shown in census samples from their countries of origin.
To ascertain where the individuals in our sample came from, we matched the Court of This suggested another possible sample selection bias, if those who were freed or sentenced to death had characteristics different from the rest of the defendants. However, we found no qualitative evidence to suggest that slaves from some regions were punished more severely than others. And when we compared the human capital of slaves who were sent to Robben Island with those who were not, we found no significant difference between the two groups. 41 Those not sent to Robben island were some 4 per cent more numerate, but this was to be expected. A very small number of these had committed no crime. Many had committed a severe crime such as murder, and, as mentioned above, murderers were around 4 per cent more numerate across the whole sample -which is again statistically insignificant. Hence we concluded that we could find no significant difference between those sent to Robben Island and those who were not (the small difference observed was caused by crime severity), which suggested we did not have to worry about this possible bias.
In conclusion we can state that most of the biases that we could imagine theoretically seem to be small empirically. We should keep in mind, however, that the petty crime bias might imply that our estimates are 3 to 3.5 per cent too low for the early birth cohort and 3.5 to 4 per cent too low for later cohorts.
IV
We ran regressions to estimate the ethnic breakdown of age-heaping after controlling for birth cohort, gender and age composition. We differentiated between slaves born at the Cape, slaves born in Mozambique or Madagascar or Mauritius, slaves with unknown 41 We controlled for cohort effects. Table available from the authors. birthplaces, European descendants, native Khoesan, slaves born in south-east Asian (mainly Indonesians), slaves from India, and slaves from China (see Table 6 ).
[ To discover whether there were changes over time, in a separate regression we interacted the birth region and ethnic groups discussed above with three birth cohort dummy variables: an early birth cohort (1650s-1740s), a middle birth cohort (1750s-1780s) and a late birth cohort (the 1790s) (see Table 7 ). Our choice of birth decade cohorts was based on a combination of data availability (we had many more cases for the last decade -the 1790s 42 We constructed a gender dummy through a subjective interpretation of the slave names. Because there were some names for which the gender was not entirely clear, we attach less weight to this variable.
represent about one-third of our data set -which we therefore treated separately) and a 'natural' round date, such as the one of 1750.
To partially control for the selection biases discussed earlier, we included a variable representing the share of severe crimes by decade and included it in the regression above (see Table 9 , column 2). We also restricted the regression to non-severe crimes (column 3). In all three cases, almost all coefficients were virtually unchanged. As a result, we conclude that the selection bias effects were at best very small.
The Europeans maintained their high levels of numeracy throughout the three birth periods. In all three periods, their ABCC index was consistently between 92 and 93 (see The other groups in Table 9 had substantially lower levels, as could be expected from the results above. However, interestingly, the ABCC levels of Indian and Indonesia slaves (south-east Asians) declined from the early birth cohort to the middle cohort, and the same happened to Khoesan and slaves of unknown origin. Cape-born and Mozambican slaves were only available in sufficient numbers during the latter two birth cohorts. Their numeracy levels, as well as those of Khoesan and slaves of unknown origin, increased between the middle and the late cohorts.
The differences in numeracy between the cohorts, shown in Table 10 , vary in significance. For Indian slaves the coefficient (-1.15), referring to the early cohort, with the middle cohort as a reference category, is not statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.
For south-east Asian slaves, on the other hand, the coefficient is significant and negative for the development between the early and middle cohorts. This might be due to a larger number of observations, or it may be a genuine difference. 44 For Europeans we were able to cover all three birth cohorts (and hence we have two reference categories) -so we were able to compare the early with the middle and the middle with the late. Both coefficients are not statistically significant at the 0.10 level, which implies that the already high level of numeracy among Europeans at the Cape did not decline or increase. For the Khoesan, for whom we also had three cohorts and a relatively large number of observations, the coefficients are statistically significant: first a decline, and then an increase.
One way we can evaluate our estimates of numeracy based on our sample is to compare them with other sources. Unfortunately, until now, little has been known about African, south and south-east Asian numeracy in the early modern period, and some of the small bits of information that are available are based on modest sample sizes. However, comparing those bits with our evidence does help to evaluate both sources.
45
Portuguese inquisition files allow a rough comparison. Juif and Baten suggested how to adjust numeracy figures for Portuguese inquisition cases (minus 13 ABCC points), and as 44 The over-representation of south-east Asian slaves in our sample and the under-representation of Madagascan and Indian slaves, for example, may account for some of these differences. 45 The earliest evidence on south- Cape were more likely to be sold at higher prices than imported slaves. 58 They argue that this difference is explained by the local slaves' knowledge of the local language, culture and geography, and their lower susceptibility to disease. We suggest another reason for the price premium: their higher level of human capital evidenced by their slightly higher levels of basic numeracy. We stress, of course, that we are speaking of very basic skills, such as counting with integers to 50. It should be noted that the free populations of many countries were also not very advanced in those basic skills during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
59
Some might wonder whether numerical ability would be valued in slaves and whether it might rather be considered dangerous for a master to have an educated slave. But the image of a slave performing only fieldwork that required physical strength and permanently supervised by his master is a modern myth. Though it was the reality for some slaves, the majority did the same kind of work as the other farmhands. For farming to be efficient, some very basic abilities were important. Green also suggests that an active market existed for hiring slaves, moving from wheat and wine farms depending on need. 60 Slaves with more skills would have earned a higher income for their master. 73 We note that the general poor quality of education in South Africa today is largely the result of differences in the quality of education black and white children receive and not necessarily the number of schooling years (attainment). Even so, significant differences in attainment remain; see Lam et al., 'Schooling as a lottery'. It is also very likely that past discrepancies in the attainment of education influence present discrepancies in the quality of education.
forced) immigration from diverse world regions, we find that high inequality was often the result: for example, Brazil had a very unequal society over most of its history, as did Cuba before the revolution. 74 Both countries had substantial immigration from world regions with initially large differences in numeracy. Because of high and persistent differences in the levels of human capital, these countries were 'locked into' a pattern of persistent income inequality.
VII
In this study we used the Whipple index, an age-heaping indicator, to provide information on the basic numeracy of various settler groups in the Cape Colony in the early modern period and thus shed light on some patterns and processes of educational and economic development. Our data from the Court of Justice records provided new estimates of numeracy levels for the Colony.
We found high levels of numeracy for European settlers at the Cape, similar to their counterparts in their regions of origin in Holland and north-western Germany. But our most revealing findings were for eighteenth-century slaves of various origins. Slaves from India, Indonesia and Mozambique had significantly lower levels of numeracy than slaves born in the Cape Colony. Overall, numeracy in south Asia between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries either barely changed or was initially fairly low, declined sharply during the late eighteenth century and finally made a modest recovery. Comparing south Asia to Europe, the difference in numeracy was probably only in the range of 20 in the sixteenth century, but then improved substantially during the eighteenth century, and was more than 60 during the early nineteenth century. 75 The period of decline in the late eighteenth century, which we also identify for south-east Asia and regions of Africa, should be researched in 74 Twrdek, 'Cuba, the "always most faithful island"', p.4; Engerman and Sokoloff, Economic development, p.18 . 00 Note: * represents statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the 5%, and *** at the 1% level. 'Constant' refers to theft. N is smaller here than in the general sample because in four cases the crime was not specified. The coefficients were multiplied by 125, see Note: To calculate crime per capita (columns 5 to 8), we divided the number of crimes (columns 1 to 4) by the slave population as reported by Shell (1994) . We calculated the underlying population for the early birth cohorts as the populations of 1660, 1670 … 1770 (we used lags of 30 years, because this corresponds roughly to the mean age of criminals), the populations of 1780, 1790, 1800, 1810 for the middle birth cohort, and 1820 for the late cohort. Rates (columns 5 to 8) are decadal crimes per 1,000 of population. 'N' refers to the total number of crimes. There are 10 decades of the early cohort, four of the middle, and only one decade of the late cohort. 'Sum/Avg.' in rows 4 and 8 refers to sums in columns 1 to 4 and arithmetic averages in columns 5 to 9. See Appendix F on the decline of murder rates in Europe. 
Appendix B (online): Heaping on other preferred digits
Other forms of heaping could be on multiples of 12 and on multiples of 2 in particular. A heaping on multiples of 12 has been observed for early-modern European samples (because Christianity emphasizes the number of 12 apostles). 77 However, in our sample, multiples of twelve are not preferred. For example, fewer people report an age of 24 than 26. Among the Europeans, from whom such a heaping could be most easily expected, the rounding on multiples of 12 is also not observed.
In contrast, multiples of 2 are preferred over odd numbers. Africans and Asians in our study), the standard measure of the ABCC index allows international and between-group comparisons more easily. These measures should be standardized for the lower heaping on multiples of 5 in the 23 to 32 age group, however.
Appendix C (online): Development of the court system
Initially, lawsuits were prearranged and controlled by Governor Jan van Riebeeck and his council. 80 The Governor played a key role in the final decision-making of the court, as he invariably retained a right to veto sentences that were passed. Dooling, Law and community, p. 3. These local councils or boards also had so-called veldcornets or armed patrols to help them police the rural districts and gather vital information or evidence on criminal cases. Notwithstanding the allowances made by the Company and Lord's XVII, strict control was maintained over the heemraden and landdrosts. The early legal system at the Cape was therefore made up of three main bodies; first, the Court of Justice in Cape Town, second, the Fiscal as prosecutor, and third, the heemraden, who had to impose the law and regulations in the rural districts.
As in the Netherlands and Dutch East Indies, attorneys could defend the accused during lawsuits in the Court of Justice. In stark contrast to the legal defence and representation of European wrongdoers, the non-Europeans and slaves were largely left to defend themselves. In essence, the slaves were initially legally defenceless, as they did not possess any rights or privileges whatsoever because they were emphatically regarded as forms of 'possessions'. Entrenchment of colonial rule affected the behaviour of colonial subjects. According to Heese, there was a marked decline in slaves deserting their masters towards the end of the eighteenth century, as their 'mentality of subjugation increased' and the futility of escape became apparent. Figure F1 shows his estimates for the Netherlands and Belgium. His estimates are from the fourteenth century to the present. We were interested in the period between the mid-seventeenth century and 1800. Homicide rates declined in this period from around eight to 11 annually per 100,000 population to around one to three. As the evidence in our paper was per decade, our comparative values on the same scale for the Europeans would decline from 13 per 100,000 population to two (see Table 5 ). Our sample included the category 'murder' rather than homicide in general. However, as most homicides are murders, we can argue that the decline in murders for Europeans in our Cape sample is very similar to Eisner's estimates for the decline in homicide, the rate being perhaps only marginally higher for Europeans in our sample. 88 Ramachandran, 'Rinderpest'. 89 Spinage, Cattle plague. 90 Broadberry and Gupta, 'The historical roots'; Clingingsmith and Williamson, 'Deindustrialization'. 91 Eisner, 'Modernization'. 
